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Abstract
We show that for industrialization and international wage conver-
gence through multi-plant foreign direct investment (FDI) to occur,
the measure of the quality of the social infrastructure in the South rela-
tive to that in the North must be at least as large as the South-North
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wage ratio. We also show that if profitable FDI flows already take
place from the North to the most productive economy in the South,
then less productive Southern economies can also become recipients of
FDI, provided that they are integrated into the world trading system,
and there are no impediments to the decline of their wage levels. An
increase in the size of public debt in the North decreases the amount
of FDI outflow. Incorporating human capital accumulation decisions,
we show that FDI flows to the South result in increased skill premiums
in the North but they also lead to a period of higher global growth
rate as well as a narrower North-South unskilled wage gap.
JEL classification: F21, F23, O14
Keywords: multi-plant FDI, convergence, social infrastructure
1. Introduction
In the 1960s, when it was fashionable for developing countries to shut
their doors to inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and to industrialize
through import substitution, Singapore chose an alternative path of eco-
nomic development. Going against the tide, Singapore sought to industrial-
ize through attracting multinational corporations (MNCs) to base affiliates
within its shores to produce parts and components, which were then exported
back to the home country for final assembly. Figures 1 and 2 tell the story of
one dimension of the economic miracle that followed. With steady increases
in the stock of FDI—principally from the United States, the United Kingdom
and Japan—Singapore’s wage level caught up substantially to the levels of
its principal source countries. From a mere 10 percent of the US and UK
wage levels in 1970, Singapore’s wage level reached over 60 percent of the US
level and nearly 70 percent of the UK level by the end of the 90s.
In this paper, we are motivated by the Singapore experience to ask what
economic principles, operating within a well-specified general-equilibrium
model of the world economy, are likely to be at work to produce such in-
ternational wage convergence via FDI. Can another emerging economy with
little natural resources and a small domestic market like Singapore or a coun-
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try with a large but poor population like many former socialist economies
in Asia (e.g. Cambodia and Vietnam) and Eastern Europe, adopt a similar
economic strategy to achieve a take-off into industrialization? What would
it have to do? A central thesis of this paper is that the quality of social
infrastructure, to use the term coined by Hall and Jones (1999) to describe
the quality of institutions and government policies, in the South compared
to that in the North is a prime factor influencing the size of international
investment flows from the North to the South. The inflow of FDI to the
South, in turn, acts to pull up Southern wages.1 In Figure 3, we show scat-
ter plots relating the size of the stock of inward FDI to the index of social
infrastructure developed by Hall and Jones (1999), with 1.0 denoting the
highest quality and zero the lowest quality. (The countries with the high-
est measured levels of social infrastructure using the Hall-Jones index are
Switzerland, the United States, and Canada; three countries that are close
to the lowest in social infrastructure are Zaire, Haiti, and Bangladesh.) Al-
though Hall and Jones constructed their index without regard to the inflows
of FDI, our scatter plots, for a grouping of all 120 countries and for a group-
ing of developing countries alone, show a positive relationship between the
quality of social infrastructure and the size of inward stock of FDI in 1995.
This paper’s hypothesis is that the relationship shows causality, not merely
correlation, so that raising the quality of social infrastructure leads to the
inward flow of FDI. To support our thesis, we first develop a theory where
the measure of the quality of social infrastructure in the South relative to
that in the North is a key determinant of North-South FDI flows. Then we
conduct a case study of Singapore, a country that relied almost entirely on
this strategy to industrialize and by all accounts succeeded via this strategy
to dramatically raise its standard of living within the span of less than forty
years, to draw out the main features of social infrastructure that seem to be
important for attracting FDI.
We think that the exercise we perform in this paper is useful for several
reasons. First, an influential view in the theory of economic development
makes the reliance on a huge domestic market a necessary component of a
strategy for economic take-off (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989a, 1989b).
Murphy et al. cite the fact that although reliance on international trade is an
1Our theory will consider throughout an integrated North where horizontal investment
flows occur naturally among the developed Northern economies.
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important part of the success story of some developing countries, these same
countries nevertheless satisfied a precondition that their domestic market was
large. This argument, however, does not apply to the city-state of Singapore.
It is true that Singapore’s first development plan was initially premised upon
the prospect of a Common Malayan Market with a combined population
of ten million. But that strategy was abandoned in 1965 when Singapore
left the Malaysian Federation. It then became clear that industrialization
could not be based upon producing and selling to a domestic market of only
two million people, many of whom were unemployed. Instead, Singapore
made a conscious effort to attract MNCs to its shore, mainly to produce
intermediaries which were then exported back to the home country for final
assembly, the central pillar of its economic strategy. This example, as well
as the later examples of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, which adopted a
similar strategy, serve as a motivation for us to develop, at a theoretical level,
the general principles that operate to enable an economy lacking a sizeable
domestic market to achieve the catch-up to Northern wages.2
Second, it is necessary to draw insights from two separate strands of
the economic literature over the past two decades—one documenting the
empirical importance of, and modeling of, multi-plant multinational enter-
prises or horizontal investment, and another the dynamic models of trade and
innovation—to provide an empirically satisfying account of economic devel-
opment through international investment. Such an Industrial Organization-
based theory of economic development through international investment is
needed because the standard neoclassical theory of international capital flows
fails empirically (Lucas, 1990). In that model, with two countries producing
2Perhaps as a reflection of the lessons learned from the Singapore experience, Singa-
pore’s Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said in a speech given at The Forbes Global
CEO Conference held in Singapore on September 19, 2001: “ASEAN countries must also
continue efforts to attract foreign investment. To a greater or lesser extent, all need invest-
ments by MNCs to create jobs, upgrade skills and technology, and generate exports. Some
economists have advocated building up the domestic economy as an alternative strategy,
to lessen a country’s vulnerability to external problems. But while promoting indigenous
cottage industries can be useful, this by itself will not enable countries to move up the
economic ladder.”
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the same good with the same constant-returns-to-scale production function
relating output to homogeneous capital and labor inputs, the marginal prod-
uct of capital is higher in the South where capital is scarce (relative to the
size of the labor force). Consequently, if there are no barriers to the inter-
national flows of capital, FDI will flow from the North to the South until
capital-labor ratios are equalized, and hence Southern wages will converge to
Northern levels. Lucas (1990) establishes that the assumptions on technol-
ogy and trade conditions underlying the standard neoclassical model “must
be drastically wrong,” and he asks, “[B]ut exactly what is wrong with them,
and what assumptions should replace them? This is a central question for
economic development.” (p. 92)
In this paper, we propose to depart from the standard neoclassical model
by introducing multi-plant cost advantages in an international context. Markusen
(1984) was the first to develop a general-equilibrium model of multi-plant
economies achieved through horizontal FDI. (See Markusen and Maskus
(2001) for a recent update of the empirical importance of such investment
flows.) That paper’s model, however, is entirely static, hence not a growth
model. The other strand of the literature is best summarized in the work
of Grossman and Helpman (1991). Although multinational enterprises are
incorporated into their growth model, the authors essentially seek to iden-
tify how vertical investment arises when conditions for international factor
price equalization fail. The problem is that empirical evidence so far sug-
gests strong support for the horizontal approach to investment flows, but
little support for the vertical approach (Markusen and Maskus, 2001). Our
paper is an attempt to correct this defect; it studies the conditions under
which horizontal FDI takes place in a dynamic setting, and how multi-plant
FDI flows in turn affect the global growth rate as well as the evolution of the
North-South wage gap. In our theory, Northern firms, who are the only ones
engaging in product innovation, generate bigger streams of profit if they can
find cost-effective locations overseas to base multiple plants to manufacture
using the design blueprints developed in the home country. We find that
the quality of the social infrastructure in the South compared to that in the
North is a prime factor influencing the size of such investment flows.
Third, the question of how conventional macroeconomic factors in the
North can affect the outflow of FDI, and the consequent evolution of the
wage gap, is one that has not been formally addressed in the literature.
Yet, over the medium term, macroeconomic factors seem to have a large
5
influence on the amount of FDI outflows from the OECD countries. For
example, from the early 70s, many OECD countries engaged in a build-up
of public debt. Then, in the 90s, the level of public debt began to decline,
most notably in the United States. In contrast to the trend in the other
OECD countries, however, Japan had a massive build-up of public debt in
the 90s—its government debt to GDP ratio doubled over the decade to reach
over 125 percent by 2001. Figure 4 shows that, in the 90s, there was a
surge of FDI outflows from the US and the UK but a marked decline in the
outward flows of FDI from Japan. Does a massive build-up of public debt
as occurred in Japan in the 90s discourage FDI outflows, and does increased
fiscal responsibility as occurred under the Rubin-Summers compact at the
US Treasury during most of the 90s tend to stimulate outflows of FDI? We
show that, in our stylized model, an increase in the level of public debt in the
North causes a slowdown in the pace of product innovation, and decreases
the size of the outflow of FDI. Therefore, long-term fiscal frugality in the
North is good for economic development of the South in our theory.
Finally, there is, in the advanced economies today, an anti-globalization
movement which advances the view that increased international capital flows
lead to an immiserization of Northern incomes. In fact, our analysis shows
that, in the model with homogeneous labor, the discovery of cheaper alterna-
tive sources of labor input overseas raises Northern firms’ projected streams
of future profits, hence the value of their assets, and stimulates further prod-
uct development. This serves to pull up wages. It is true that, with a
distinction made between skilled and unskilled workers, our finding is that
when conditions are right for profitable FDI to take place, the skill premium
in the North is indeed raised. At the same time, however, the pace of human
capital accumulation is increased, the global economy experiences a period
of faster growth, and the North-South unskilled wage gap is narrowed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a
dynamic model exhibiting transitional growth to show the condition under
which profitable multi-plant North-South FDI will occur, and the effect this
has on the North-South wage gap. In Section 3, we pursue two questions:
Firstly, suppose that there are many countries in the South, each with differ-
ing qualities of social infrastructure. If industrialization through FDI already
takes place in the most productive country in the South, will it necessarily
also occur in the remaining less productive Southern countries once the latter
join the international trading system? We establish the theoretical condition
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under which the whole world will become industrialized through multi-plant
FDI. Secondly, we study how public debt policy affects the size of FDI out-
flows from the North. In Section 4, we explicitly introduce the human capital
accumulation decision, and study how multi-plant FDI affects growth, the
skill premium and the North-South wage gap. In Section 5, we conduct a
case study of the Singapore economy to draw out what are the main features
of social infrastructure that attract FDI inflows. We make some concluding
remarks in Section 6.
2. The model
We suppose that there are two regions in the world economy we call North
and South. The asymmetry across the two regions lies in their technological
capabilities. Only in the North is there the capability to engage in R&D to
develop the next state-of-the-art brand of intermediary.3 It is this constant
flow of innovation activity that pushes out the world technology frontier.
For now, we let each region be homogeneous. In the absence of FDI inflows,
we assume that only cottage industries exist in the South, which produce
a competitive good A according to the production function, QA = a
−1
S LSA.
Here, we interpret a−1S as reflecting a measure of the quality of social infras-
tructure in the South. Labor force (equal to population) size in the South is
equal to LS. In the absence of FDI inflows, all labor is employed in sector A,
so LSA = LS. Under competition, Southern wage is given by wS = pAa
−1
S ,
where pA is the world price of good A.
The North produces an industrial final good I that is assembled from a
range of differentiated intermediate capital goods according to the production
function, QI = [
∫ n
0 x
α
i di]
1/α, 0 < α < 1, where xi is the output of intermedi-
ate capital good i, (1−α)−1 gives the elasticity of demand for the input, and
n (a large number) is a measure of the range of varieties of capital inputs.
To keep the algebra tractable, it is convenient to assume that capital inputs
depreciate by 100 percent when used in production. Assuming symmetry
across intermediate capital goods, we can write QI = n
(1−α)/αX, X ≡ nx.
Firms in the North engage in private sector R&D to generate the next va-
riety of the differentiated intermediate capital good. The resource cost of
3Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) estimate that over 90 percent of the R& D expenditure
in the world is carried out in the OECD.
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developing a new design blueprint is given by wNbN , bN > 0, where wN is
Northern wage. With free entry and exit in the research activity, for n˙ > 0,
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative, we have
wNbN = v. (1)
Here, v is the asset value of a brand of differentiated capital good. Using
R&D resource cost as our numeraire, we have v = 1, so wN = b
−1
N .
Once a blueprint has been designed, it is sent to the manufacturing floor
for production. With the North treated as homogeneous, multi-plant FDI
occurs extensively among the developed countries in the North.4 The div-
idend per firm is given by pi ≡ pxx − wNaNx, where px is the price of the
typical intermediate capital good, and a−1N measures the quality of social
infrastructure in the North. Maximization of per firm dividend gives the
condition:
wN =
αpx
aN
, (2)
whence px = aN(αbN)
−1. Next, using (2), pi = (1 − α)pxX/n. With perfect
competition in the production of good I, the value of final output is equal to
the total value of assembled inputs if QI > 0, that is, pIQI = pxX. Hence,
we can write
pi =
(1− α)pIQI
n
. (3)
We let labor force (equal to population) size in the North be given by LN .
Households in the North and South are assumed to be identical, and growing
at the identical growth rate of γ. Each agent has a constant probability of
death, θ, as in Blanchard (1985), with each worker turning over his wealth
to an actuarially fair annuity company, and receiving a return of r + θ on
his annuity. There is a perfect international bond market. Each household
born at time s solves an intertemporal problem determining its current and
expected stream of consumption:
Max
∫ ∞
t
log[u(τ, s)] exp−(θ+ρ)(τ−t) dτ
s.t.
∫ ∞
t
E(τ, s) exp−
∫ τ
t
(rν+θ)dν dτ ≤
∫ ∞
t
Y (τ) exp−
∫ τ
t
(rν+θ)dν dτ +W (t, s),
4Markusen (2002) documents that two-way horizontal FDI flows are common between
pairs of developed countries.
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where W (s, s) = 0. Here, Y is non-interest income, W is non-human wealth,
E is consumer expenditure, r is the short-term real rate of interest, and ρ is
the subjective rate of time preference. Solving this problem, and aggregating
across all cohorts alive at time t, we obtain
E˙
E
= r − ρ− (γ + θ)(θ + ρ)W
E
, (4)
where, in the absence of public debt, W = nv/L, L ≡ LS + LN being the
size of the global labor force. Note that E is per capita world aggregate
consumption expenditure and W is per capita world aggregate non-human
wealth. Letting the period utility function be Cobb-Douglas with σ being
the share of total expenditure going to good I, we have pICI = σE. In
market-equilibrium, LCI = QI , so pIQI = σLE. Using this in (3), we have
r = pi =
(1− α)σE
n/L
, (5)
since by our normalization, v = 1. Substituting (5) into (4), we get
E˙
E
=
(1− α)σE
n˜
− ρ− (γ + θ)(θ + ρ)n˜
E
, (6)
where we define n˜ ≡ n/L.
Workers in the North are allocated to two activities: R&D and manufac-
turing. Hence, bN n˙+ aNX = LN , which we can rewrite as
˙˜n = b−1N [L˜N −
aNX
L
]− γn˜, (7)
where L˜N ≡ LN/L. We now want to express X in terms of E. Noting that
pxX = pIQI = σLE, and px = aN(αbN)
−1, we obtain aNX/L = σαbNE.
Using this result in (7), we get
˙˜n = b−1N [L˜N − σαbNE]− γn˜. (8)
Eqs. (6) and (8) give us two dynamic equations in E and n˜ to characterize
the equilibrium path of the world economy, given an initial value of n˜. We
see in Figure 5 that a unique saddle-path is obtained. Suppose the world
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economy is initially in a steady state. It is straightforward to show that the
steady-state wage gap in the absence of North-South FDI flow is given by5
wN
wS
=
σαL˜S
(1− σ)L˜N
[
1 +
γ
σα(E
n˜
)∗
]
, (9)
where
(
E
n˜
)∗ =
ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4(1− α)σ(θ + γ)(θ + ρ)
2(1− α)σ .
Let the production function for an intermediate input in the South be
given by xS = LSx/(µaS), µ > 0. By suitable choice of units, we set µ equal
to 1. Hence, xS = LSx/aS. The condition for a Northern firm with patent
rights to a particular design blueprint to find it profitable to base another
manufacturing plant in the South is: wNaN ≥ wSaS. Using (9), we can
express the condition for profitable FDI outflow from the North as:
σαL˜S
(1− σ)L˜N
1 + γ
α
(
ρ+
√
ρ2+4(1−α)σ(θ+γ)(θ+ρ)
2(1−α)
)
 ≥ aSaN . (10)
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For positive FDI flow to take place from the North to the
South, the degree of relative backwardness of South’s social infrastructure
compared to the North (measured by aS/aN) must not be greater than the
North-South wage gap (wN/wS). The North-South wage gap, in turn, is
larger, the greater is the relative size of the Southern labor force (LS/LN),
the larger is the share of world expenditure on the industrial final good I
(σ), the faster is the steady-state growth rate of new products (determined
5The steps are as follows: Since by our normalization, wN = b−1N , and wS = pAa
−1
S ,
wN/wS = aS/(pAbN ). However, by the global market-clearing condition for good A,
pA = (1 − σ)aSE/L˜S . Consequently, wN/wS = L˜S/[(1 − σ)bNE]. Next, setting E˙ = 0
in (6), and ˙˜n = 0 in (8), we have a pair of equations to determine the steady-state values
of E and n˜. Substituting the steady-state value of E into the expression of wN/wS , we
obtain (9).
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in this model by labor force growth, γ), the smaller is the subjective rate of
time preference (ρ), and the longer is the expected length of life (θ−1).
Since the quality of the social infrastructure in the South relative to that
in the North is itself independent of the factors determining the North-South
wage gap, there is no reason why profitable FDI flows will take place from the
North to the South. When the inequality in (10) is not satisfied, no North-
South FDI flows take place even though the North and South are engaged
in international exchange of goods.6 Given aS/aN , it is interesting that
a slowdown of population growth (γ) inhibits the outflow of FDI from the
North. This is because a decline in population growth slows down the growth
of ideas, which is what keeps the world economy growing in this model, and
reduces the North-South wage gap. The relative advantage of building a new
plant in the South is accordingly diminished with slower growth, given aS/aN .
We are now interested in answering the following question: If starting initially
at the steady state, the condition is satisfied for profitable North-South FDI
flow to occur, how is the path of the North-South wage gap affected? We
have the next proposition:
Proposition 2. When the condition for profitable North-South FDI flow
to occur is satisfied, the North-South wage gap immediately drops and then
gradually narrows even further.
To prove the second proposition, we note that in the steady state in the
absence of North-South FDI flow, we can replace the term E in wN/wS =
L˜S/[(1−σ)bNE] by the value of E that makes ˙˜n = 0, namely, E = (σαbN)−1L˜N−
(σα)−1γn˜, to give
wN
wS
=
L˜S
bN(1− σ)
[
L˜N
σαbN
− γn˜
σα
] .
Using this, we can re-write the condition for profitable North-South FDI flow,
namely, wNaN ≥ wSaS, as:
σαaN L˜S − aS(1− σ)L˜N + aS(1− σ)bNγn˜ ≥ 0. (11)
6Such an equilibrium consists only of intra-North multi-plant FDI flows but zero North-
South FDI flow.
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We now want to use the condition in (11) to show that when profitable
North-South FDI flow occurs, it shifts the stationary locus for ˙˜n = 0 in
Figure 5 rightwards, hence upwards. When multi-plant North-South FDI
occurs, the design blueprint developed in the North is communicated to both
the Northern as well as Southern manufacturing facilities for production.
Consequently, with North-South FDI flow, X = XN +XS, where XN is the
total amount of intermediaries produced in the North, and XS is the amount
produced in the South. In the South then, labor is allocated to two different
sectors: the sector with the cottage industries and the industrial sector. Note
that if there are no barriers to international investment, North-South FDI
flows take place until the unit costs are equalized, that is, wNaN = wSaS.
The condition that total labor demand equals labor supply in the South is
given by LSA + aSXS = LS, where XS ≡ nxS. To solve for LSA, we note
that wSLSA = (1 − σ)LE. Using the arbitrage condition under unhindered
international investment, wNaN = wSaS, and our normalization wNbN = 1,
we can write LSA = (1− σ)aSbNLE/aN . Therefore,
XS =
1
aS
[
LS − (1− σ)aSbNLE
aN
]
,
which, upon using in bN n˙ + aNXN = LN with XN = X − XS and aNX =
σαbNLE, yields
˙˜n =
L˜N
bN
+
aN L˜S
bNaS
− [ασ + 1− σ]E − γn˜. (12)
The equation for the stationary locus ˙˜n = 0 with positive North-South FDI
flow is given by
E =
1
ασ + 1− σ
[
L˜N
bN
+
aN L˜S
bNaS
− γn˜
]
.
At any given n˜, we can check that the stationary locus for ˙˜n = 0 is now
higher than the original stationary locus given by E = (σα)−1[b−1N L˜N − γn˜].
To prove this, we show that
1
ασ + 1− σ
[
L˜N
bN
+
aN L˜S
bNaS
− γn˜
]
− 1
ασ
[
L˜N
bN
+−γn˜
]
> 0,
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which is the case if and only if the condition in (11) is satisfied. Hence, if
the condition for profitable North-South FDI flow is satisfied, we obtain the
trajectory given in Figure 6. We see from there that E immediately jumps
up, and then continues to rise until it reaches a new steady state where E
and n˜ are both higher. The implied closing of the North-South wage gap
can be read off from the relation, wN/wS = L˜S/[(1 − σ)bNE], so when the
opportunity to build cost-effective multiple plants overseas opens up, we find
E jumping up, which raises the rate of return to the R& D activity (see
equation (5)), increases the pace of product innovation, and pulls up the
Southern wage relative to Northern wage.
How is the narrowing of the North-South wage gap effected? We show
expressions for the real wages of a typical worker in the North and South
below:
wN
pI
=
αn
(1−α)
α
aN
,
wN
pA
=
L˜S
(1− σ)aSbNE ,
wS
pI
=
(1− σ)αbNn (1−α)α E
aN L˜S
,
wS
pA
=
1
aS
.
Upon opening up to inflows of FDI from the North, the Southern worker’s
real consumption wage clearly jumps up, and continues a steady rise until it
reaches a higher level in the new steady state so he is unambiguously better
off. As for the Northern worker, his wage in terms of the industrial good is
unchanged on impact (since n is a slow-moving state variable) but his wage
in terms of good A drops, and continues to decline to reach a permanently
lower level in the new steady state. The decline of the Northern worker’s real
wage in terms of good A is, however, compensated by a higher than normal
increase of the real wage in terms of the industrial good as the number of
new products grows at a rate faster than γ for a period. Hence the Northern
worker’s real consumption wage, which falls initially, can finally rise above
its original level, especially if the share of expenditure going to the industrial
good I is high.
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It is worth pointing out that our model predicts conditional convergence
rather than absolute convergence. In the new steady state associated with
unhindered international investment flows, unit costs in the Northern and
Southern plants are equated so wS/wN = a
−1
S /a
−1
N . Absolute convergence is
obtained only if a−1S = a
−1
N . If the index of the quality of social infrastructure
in the South is, say, only 70 percent of the level in the North, then interna-
tional investment flows, when they occur, can bring the Southern wage only
up to 70 percent of the Northern wage level in the new steady state.
3. Extension to many countries and public debt shock
3.1 Extension to multiple Southern countries
Suppose that there are J number of countries in the South with different
levels of quality of social infrastructure, a1S < a
2
S < · · · < aJS, with country 1
having the best social infrastructure, and country J having the worst social
infrastructure.7 Let the North currently be engaged in international trade
only with the most productive Southern economy, and let the condition for
profitable foreign direct investment in country 1 also be satisfied so Northern
firms have multiple plants in country 1. The question to be answered is
the following: Will the decision by all the other less productive Southern
economies to integrate into the world trading system be sufficient to generate
FDI inflows? We want to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the North trades with all the countries in
the South, each with differing qualities of social infrastructure. Then, if
the North finds it profitable to place multiple plants in the most productive
Southern economy, it must find it profitable also to place multiple plants in
the less productive economies, provided that there are no impediments to
wage adjustments in the less productive Southern economies.
7It would be straightforward to introduce some diversity in the index of social infras-
tructure in the countries in the North as well although there is much less diversity among
countries in the North. (The correlation coefficient between the output per worker and the
index of social infrastructure in the Hall and Jones sample is 0.89.) International trade in
goods alone will equalize the unit wage cost across Northern countries.
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With trade among all the countries, market-clearing of good A requires
that
∑J
j=1w
j
SL
j
S = (1 − σ)E. Using wjS = pA/ajS, and wN = b−1N under our
normalization, we obtain
wN
w1S
=
a1S
∑J
j=1(L
j
S/a
j
S)
bN(1− σ)E . (13)
Using the value of E that makes ˙˜n = 0 in the absence of North-South FDI
flow, namely, E = (σαbN)
−1L˜N − (σα)−1γn˜, and substituting the steady-
state value of n˜, the condition that is satisfied for FDI to flow to country 1
is
σαa1S
∑J
j=1(L
j
S/a
j
S)
(1− σ)LN
1 + γ
α
(
ρ+
√
ρ2+4(1−α)σ(θ+γ)(θ+ρ)
2(1−α)
)
 ≥ a1SaN . (14)
For FDI flow to occur from the North to country j; j = 2, 3, · · · , J , we must
have wNaN ≥ wjSajS; j = 2, 3, · · · , J . However, we see from (13) that we can
write
wN =
w1Sa
1
S
∑J
j=1(L
j
S/a
j
S)
bN(1− σ)E .
The condition that FDI flows from the North to country 1 is that [wNaN ]/[w
1
Sa
1
S] ≥
1, which we can now write as
wNaN
w1Sa
1
S
=
aN
∑J
j=1(L
j
S/a
j
S)
bN(1− σ)E ≥ 1,
or, replacing E,
σαaN
∑J
j=1(L
j
S/a
j
S)
(1− σ)LN
1 + γ
α
(
ρ+
√
ρ2+4(1−α)σ(θ+γ)(θ+ρ)
2(1−α)
)
 ≥ 1. (15)
Since, with free international trade, pA = w
1
Sa
1
S = w
2
Sa
2
S = · · · = wJSaJS, it
follows that if (15) is satisfied for country 1, then
wNaN
wjSa
j
S
≥ 1; for j = 2, 3, · · · , J,
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so we find that if the condition for profitable FDI flow into the most pro-
ductive Southern economy is satisfied, the integration of the less productive
Southern economies into the world trading system ensures that these latter
economies also satisfy the condition for profitable FDI flows.
To understand this result, let us compare country 2 with country 1 in
the South. Suppose that the index of the quality of social infrastructure in
country 2 is only half as good as the index in country 1 so a2S = 2a
1
S. If
w1Sa
1
S < wNaN , then our result says that if country 2 chooses to join the
international trading system, it necessarily follows that w2Sa
2
S < wNaN . The
reason is that international competition brings w2Sa
2
S into equality with w
1
Sa
1
S
so w2S = 0.5w
1
S, that is, international trade competition drives the wage level
in Southern country 2 down to half the level of Southern country 1. As Kravis
(1970) emphasized, international trade plays a handmaiden role in economic
development in that it brings a country’s cost structures in line with external
prices.
An important qualification to the result that free trade facilitates the in-
flow of FDI is that there should be no impediment to the decline of wage
levels in the less productive Southern economies when they join the interna-
tional trading system. It may be possible, however, that for efficiency wage
reasons, wages cannot decline without greatly hurting worker productivity.
Then cost minimization requires the payment of an incentive-compatible min-
imum wage. To take a particular formulation of the efficiency wage hypoth-
esis, it could be that the wage levels in Zaire or Haiti may already be so
low in the absence of international trade that they cannot go down further
without substantially reducing the amount of nutritional intake below the
minimum level required for productive work. In such a situation, opening
up to international trade will cause a fall of the demand wage below the
minimum supply wage, with the consequence that massive unemployment
must inevitably result. In such a case, there does not exist an equilibrium in
the very low productivity economy under free trade where there is a positive
level of equilibrium employment.8
8Continuing with our example of Southern economies 1 and 2, under free trade,
w2S/w
1
S = a
1
S/a
2
S = 1/2. Let p
C denote the consumer price index, which is the same
in both countries under the assumption of that all goods are tradable and preferences are
identical. Then w2S/p
C = 0.5(w1S/p
C). If the real consumption wage, w2S/p
C , is below the
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3.2 A helicopter drop of public debt
Suppose that in the North, there is a helicopter drop of public debt, which
we suppose is equal to the amount βL. There are two ways of thinking about
how this affects the outward flow of FDI from the North. The first is to see
how, starting at an initial steady state with no North-South FDI flow, a
helicopter drop of public debt decreases the North-South wage gap so that a
smaller relative inefficiency of Southern social infrastructure compared to the
North is now required for profitable North-South FDI flow to occur. With
positive levels of public debt, the North-South wage gap originally given in
(9) is replaced by
wN
wS
=
σαL˜S
(1− σ)L˜N
[
1 +
γ
σα(E
n˜
)∗∗
]
, (16)
where
(
E
n˜
)∗∗ =
ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4(1− α)σ(θ + γ)(θ + ρ)(1 + βn˜−1)
2(1− α)σ .
Differentiating, we obtain
d(E/n˜)∗∗
dβ
∣∣∣∣∣
β=0
=
(θ + γ)(θ + ρ)
n˜∗∗
√
ρ2 + 4(1− α)σ(θ + γ)(θ + ρ)
> 0,
where
n˜∗∗ =
L˜N
σαbN [(E/n˜)∗∗ + γ(σα)−1]
.
Hence, for given aS/aN , a greater level of public debt makes the condition for
profitable North-South FDI flows, wN/wS ≥ aS/aN , more difficult to satisfy.
In the presence of North-South FDI flow, the dynamic system with posi-
tive levels of public debt is given by
E˙
E
=
(1− α)σE
n˜
− ρ− (γ + θ)(θ + ρ)(n˜+ β)
E
, (17)
˙˜n =
L˜N
bN
+
aN L˜S
bNaS
− [ασ + 1− σ]E − γn˜. (18)
minimum level required to satisfy nutritional needs for productive work, no equilibrium
with positive employment exists.
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In Figure 7, we show that the stationary locus for E˙ = 0 is shifted upwards
as a result of the helicopter drop of public debt. Consequently, the result of
increased public-sector indebtedness is a period of slowdown in the pace of
product development and the rate of outflow of FDI from the North, so that
n˜ gradually declines.
4. Introducing human capital accumulation in the North
We now differentiate between two kinds of workers: skilled and unskilled.
The South only has unskilled workers who can either work in cottage indus-
tries or, if FDI inflows occur, work in the industrial sector to produce capital
intermediate goods. In the North, unskilled workers work on the produc-
tion line to produce capital intermediate goods but skilled workers engage
in R&D activity. Workers, at the start of their life, have to decide whether
to invest in education or remain unskilled. We assume that workers in the
North differ in their abilities to learn, ζ, and these abilities are distributed
uniformly, ζ lying between 0 and 1. The effective cost of education is given
by κwuN/ζ; κ > 0, so more able workers incur a smaller cost in terms of
foregone income. Here, wuN is the unskilled worker’s wage in the North. It
is assumed that education instantaneously converts an unskilled to a skilled
worker.9 Workers choose to obtain education if
wskN −
κwuN
ζ
> wuN ,
where wskN is the skilled worker’s wage in the North. The ability of the
worker that makes the LHS equal to the RHS of the preceding expression
is given by ζ∗ = κ(ωN − 1)−1, where ωN ≡ wskN /wuN is the skill premium.
Given the uniform distribution of ability among Northern workers, we have
LskN /LN = 1− ζ∗, that is,
L˜skN = [1−
κ
ωN − 1]L˜N , (19)
where L˜skN ≡ LskN /L, and Lsk is the number of skilled workers.
9Eicher and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (2001) assume that there are fixed costs in education.
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Assuming identical preferences, (6) continues to hold but (7) is now re-
placed by
˙˜n =
L˜skN
bN
− γn˜. (20)
Noting that bNw
sk
N = v = 1 by our normalization, and using w
u
N = αpx/aN ,
and pxX = σLE, we have
ωN =
aNX
αbNσLE
.
But aNX/L = L˜
u
N = L˜N − L˜skN so
ωN =
L˜N − L˜skN
αbNσE
. (21)
Using this in (19), we can show that L˜skN = Ψ(E); Ψ
′ < 0. We can, therefore,
replace (20) with
˙˜n =
Ψ(E)
bN
− γn˜. (22)
Let us examine the condition under which North-South FDI flow occurs,
which is that wuNaN ≥ wSaS. Now, we have, before North-South FDI flows,
wSaS = (1− σ)aSE/L˜S and wuNaN = ασaNE/(L˜N − L˜skN ). Hence, the condi-
tion for North-South FDI flow to occur is
ασaN L˜S
(1− σ)aS(L˜N − L˜skN )
≥ 1. (23)
If the condition is satisfied for North-South FDI flow to occur, interna-
tional investment in our model economy takes place until wuNaN = wSaS.
Equation (6) continues to hold but the dynamic equation for n˜ is now mod-
ified. With multiple plants in the South, X = XN + XS, where XN =
(L˜N − L˜skN )/aN , and aSXS + LSA = LS. Using LSA = (1 − σ)LE/wS,
wuNaN = wSaS, and w
u
NaN = ασaNE/X, we obtain
XS =
[
ασ
ασ + 1− σ
]
LS
aS
−
[
1− σ
ασ + 1− σ
]
LN − LskN
aN
,
and hence
X =
[
ασ
ασ + 1− σ
] [
LS
aS
+
LN − LskN
aN
]
.
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We then have
wuN =
ασLE
aNX
=
(ασ + 1− σ)E
(aN
aS
)L˜S + L˜N − L˜skN
,
and since wskN = b
−1
N with our normalization, the skill premium is now given
by
ωN =
(aN
aS
)L˜S + L˜N − L˜skN
bN(ασ + 1− σ)E . (24)
Comparing (21) and (24), the crucial question is whether North-South
FDI flows raise the skill premium. This is the case, at any given E, if(aNaS )L˜S + L˜N − L˜skN
bN(ασ + 1− σ)E
− [ L˜N − L˜skN
αbNσE
]
> 0,
which simplifies to
ασaNLS
(1− σ)aS(LN − LskN )
> 1,
precisely the condition for profitable North-South FDI flow (see equation
(23)). At given E, the opportunity to reduce cost by building multiple plants
abroad leads to an increase in the skill premium, which induces more educa-
tion and hence an increase in the flow rate of new product development. In
a diagram analogous to Figure 6, there is a rightward shift of the stationary
locus of ˙˜n = 0 when the condition for profitable FDI is satisfied.
Intuitively, with the human capital accumulation decision made endoge-
nous, the opportunity to place cost-effective multiple plants overseas raises
the rate of return to the R& D activity. The increased demand for skilled
workers, who are the ones engaged in the design of new blueprints, raises
the skill premium, in turn encouraging more unskilled workers to incur the
cost of acquiring human capital. As the pool of skilled workers is enlarged,
the pace of innovation is above normal for some time, the rate of outflow of
FDI is increased, and the demand for Southern workers to work in multiple
plants placed overseas is also increased hence pulling up Southern unskilled
wages relative to Northern unskilled wages.
5. The Singapore case study
Our paper’s hypothesis is that, given the factors determining the North-
South wage gap, raising the quality of social infrastructure in the South
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increases the inward flow of FDI. Having set out the theory, we next seek
to provide further evidence that raising the quality of social infrastructure
causes an increase in the inward flow of FDI, and to identify the features
of social infrastructure that seem to be important for attracting FDI, by
turning to a case study of Singapore.10
Singapore’s success in industrialization has been largely attributed to for-
eign investment. As Figure 1 makes clear, the stock of inward FDI began a
steady climb from 1970 onwards. By 1995, the share of total manufacturing
employment contributed by wholly foreign-owned firms and joint ventures
had grown to nearly 70 percent, and the corresponding share of total man-
ufacturing output to more than 90 percent. (Wholly foreign-owned firms
alone contributed to about 50 percent of total manufacturing employment
and total manufacturing output in 1995. In that year, too, over 70 percent of
their total sales went to overseas markets.) This was the result of a conscious
government policy to create an investor-friendly environment. In his Budget
Statement presented to Parliament on March 9, 1970, Dr. Goh Keng Swee,
widely viewed as Singapore’s early economic architect, provided the rationale
behind the government’s liberal policy toward foreign investors: “We have
made long and strenuous efforts to attract foreign investment into Singapore,
but not because we need the money. The high level of our overseas assets
shows that we have more than we can usefully spend in Singapore. We wel-
come foreign investors for the two things they bring with them—technology
and markets.”
This investment-friendly environment was created and maintained through
investment incentives and facilities that were complemented by policies aimed
at achieving political stability, peaceful industrial relations, orderly wage in-
creases, and manpower development. In a survey conducted by Hughes in the
1960s of 127 firms with direct capital investment from six principal countries
investing in Singapore, it is reported that, “The main factors which foreign
investors claimed attracted them to Singapore were the government’s welcom-
ing attitude expressed in positive assistance mainly through the Economic
Development Board and other government departments and instrumentali-
ties, and the efficiency of the public services and utilities. Industrial estates
were an added bonus.” (See Hughes and You, 1969.) Hence, the government
10The case study draws from the following sources: Hughes and You (1969), Lee (1973),
Rodan (1989) and Soon (1993).
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has played a central role in improving the quality of the social infrastructure,
which propelled Singapore’s foreign-investment-driven growth process. We
outline below the historical developments in the monumental task of devel-
oping a social infrastructure that would convince foreign investors that it was
cost effective to base multiple plants in Singapore.
Toward the end of colonial rule in the 1950s, Singapore’s heavy reliance
on entrepoˆt trade was deemed inadequate to provide jobs for the increasingly
large pool of unemployed. There was also great social and political unrest
because of communist and leftist influence over increasingly discontent work-
ers, and uncertainty over the island state’s political future. Therefore, when
Singapore gained self-government from the UK in 1961, it announced the
State Development Plan, 1961-64, whose main aim was to tackle unemploy-
ment through industrialization. The Plan closely mirrored the Winsemius
Report prepared in late 1960 by a United Nations Industrial Survey Mission
headed by Albert Winsemius, which proposed that “owing to the dearth
of local industrial know-how and the structural immobility of domestically-
based capital, foreign capital would have to be seduced.” (cited in Rodan,
1989, p. 75)
Acting in Singapore’s favor in attracting FDI were the locational advan-
tage of a deep sea port at major trade routes and a generally corrupt-free
bureaucracy, which were inherited from British colonial rule.11 However,
Singapore’s existing economy of limited manufacturing in basic industries
with low productivity e.g. rubber, tin and oil, would need to overcome the
challenges of political and social instability, and the lack of physical and
financial infrastructure conducive to foreign investment. The Plan and sub-
sequent policies would build on the above advantages and act decisively to
11There is some evidence that international trade itself directly affects the quality of
social infrastructure. In Wei (2000), it is reported that “naturally more open economies”—
as determined by their size and geography—exhibit less corruption even after taking into
account their levels of development. Wei (1997) found from his sample covering bilateral
investment from fourteen source countries to forty-five host countries during 1990-91 that
an increase in the level of corruption in the host country significantly reduces inward FDI.
Consequently, international trade raises institutional quality, particularly by lowering the
extent of corruption, and so facilitates the inflow of FDI.
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tackle the stated challenges.
One of the first tasks of the new government was to control the explosive
labor unrest situation. The communists’ influence over the labor unions is
evident from the many strikes and riots in the 1950s, the height of which
was in 1955, a year which witnessed 277 strikes, and a loss of a million
man-hours. Such labor union powers had also resulted in high wage costs
in Singapore. In the late 1950s, the British authorities had already begun
the clamp down on the communists. It banned the Singapore Chinese Mid-
dle Schools Union, closed two Chinese schools, expelled 142 students and
arrested the entire leadership of the communist left. The new local govern-
ment carried on by deregistering 106 unions and absorbing the rest into the
newly formed National Trade Union Congress (NTUC). Two labor laws were
passed in 1968. The Employment Act standardized the terms and condi-
tions of employment and set limits on negotiable fringe benefits, including
holidays, sick leave, overtime, retrenchment and severance terms, and a forty-
four-hour work week. The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act excluded
from collective bargaining such issues as recruitment, retrenchment, promo-
tion, retirement, transfer, dismissal, and work assignments, placing these
matters within management’s prerogative. In addition, it spelled out new
procedures for labor negotiation and conflict resolution, including compul-
sory arbitration. Foreign investors must have found the improved industrial
relations climate attractive; the steady inflows of FDI that followed helped
to reduce unemployment and raise real wages, which helped further to main-
tain industrial peace. The number of industrial stoppages and man-days lost
from strikes dropped drastically. There has been no incidence of industrial
stoppages since 1978 except for the year 1986 when Singapore suffered a ma-
jor recession. In fact, the Department of Statistics has stopped publishing
such data since 1992.
Apart from the well-known fact of Singapore’s fiscal prudence, the es-
tablishment of key institutions is another factor behind Singapore’s success
in attracting FDI. The key institution charged with the duty of promoting
the growth of industries in Singapore is the Economic Development Board
(EDB), which was set up in August 1961. Under the 1961 Ordinance, the
EDB was given the following tasks: Underwriting the issue of stocks, shares,
bonds or debentures and guaranteeing loans; financing and management of
industrial enterprises; development of industrial sites and estates; technical
assistance to industries; and other general functions. Given the wide scope
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of the functions of the EDB, it had a part to play in each of the investment
promotion measures and social infrastructure development projects under-
taken.
Through the EDB, the Singapore government wooed foreign investors
with extremely attractive financial schemes and negligible restrictions on
the flow of capital and goods. MNCs in preferred areas of production were
offered below-market or even interest-free finance; generous tax exemptions;
and duty-free importation of machinery, equipment, and intermediate inputs.
There were also no restrictions and regulations governing the repatriation of
capital; the remittance of profits, dividends, interest and royalty payments; or
the import of goods and services for consumption, investment and production
purposes. In addition, foreign participation of up to 100 percent of foreign
equity ownership was allowed in most sectors of the economy.
Another ambitious project undertaken initially by the EDB was the build-
ing of industrial estates with full amenities. The bulk of the expenditure was
spent on developing the Jurong Industrial Town, for this proved to be the
area with the greatest scope for expansion. It was therefore appropriate that
in 1968, a new Statutory Board, the Jurong Town Corporation, was formed
to take over the management of the industrial estates from the Industrial
Facilities Division of EDB. Besides industrial estates, the government also
invested heavily in the development of public utilities, transport and com-
munications.
Social development was considered important for national and community
cohesion, but it was also vital as a form of social capital investment necessary
for industrialization. Projects for housing and education assumed greatest
significance as a well-educated populace with a secure home would contribute
to a productive workforce. With the decision to industrialize taken, it was
recognized that the education system should be adapted to turn out a better
educated and more suitably equipped workforce to meet the needs of an
industrializing and modernizing economy. To this end, a Five-year Plan
in education was introduced. The main features of this Plan were: Equal
treatment for the four streams of education—Malay, Chinese, Tamil and
English; and an emphasis on the study of Mathematics, Science and Technical
subjects. As a first step toward the realization of these aims, the government
embarked on an accelerated school building program. During 1961-3 a new
school was completed every month, and in 1964 the pace of school building
was accelerated so that a new school was built every three weeks. By the
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1963 election, there were sufficient schools to provide a place at primary
level for every child in Singapore. Later, to provide a manpower base for
industrialization, the emphasis of education was shifted to a more technical
orientation through the establishment in 1968 of the Technical Education
Department within the Ministry of Education to oversee the development
of technical education. Apart from academic schools, four other types of
schools were created at the secondary level: secondary vocational schools,
secondary technical schools, secondary commercial schools and vocational
institutions. Along with this new technical bias, the Singapore Polytechnic
and the Ngee Ann Technical College were greatly expanded and restructured
to accommodate new courses to meet the new needs of the changing economy.
Complementing the technical bias in the education system, the govern-
ment, through EDB, also involved itself in the training of existing workers to
meet skill shortages at crucial times to develop new industries. Within one
year of its establishment in 1961, the EDB had formed a Technical Consul-
tancy Division with a Manpower Development Unit, which collaborated with
local agencies, foreign governments and MNCs to set up training centers and
organize courses. The first continual upgrading and re-training program can
be traced to 1968 when the British announced the planned withdrawal of its
naval base from Singapore, and a crash program was introduced to re-train
clerical and other workers expected to become redundant. Joint industrial
training centers were also set up with MNCs, which included Tata Engi-
neering & Locomotive Co., Rollei-Werke, and Philips (Singapore) Pte Ltd.
Although the number of workers trained under these specific schemes were
small relative to those in the vocational institutes, these training programs
by EDB were crucial to meet specific manpower needs during crucial times
of shortages. Because of its investment promotional activities, the EDB has
a close relationship with industry and is able to identify manpower needs
even before they arise. As a smaller operation, it is also more flexible and
responsive, and able to convey a signal to other educational institutions of
the future manpower needs of industry.
In sum, the government of Singapore, and EDB, in particular, have been
able to develop the social infrastructure conducive to inflows of FDI. The
country has remained committed to an open liberal policy toward interna-
tional commerce and capital over many years, and it has built up a reputation
as a reliable host country to foreign investors. The generally harmonious in-
dustrial labor relations in Singapore also work to strengthen that reputation.
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By committing itself to act as a one-stop center for foreign investors, EDB
has helped to lower the transaction cost of doing business in Singapore. This
factor is fortified by a generally corruption-free business environment. Al-
though the government and EDB have been pro-active in the functioning
of the economy as a whole, they have also been responsive to market sig-
nals. As an example, one benefit the government sees in attracting foreign
investors to Singapore is that they provide a market signal to the government
about the sort of manpower training that is needed in industry. In this way,
it avoids the problem of producing large numbers of graduates who cannot
find employment in their chosen field. Apart from the benefits of a good
physical infrastructure, a comprehensive and transparent legal framework
in Singapore has also contributed to the efficient functioning of the market
mechanism and attraction of FDI to Singapore.12
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have built upon an empirically and theoretically well-
founded notion of multi-plant cost advantage to explore how convergence
can take place through international investment. One of our findings is that,
given the factors determining the North-South wage gap, the measure of
efficiency or quality of the social infrastructure of the South must not fall too
far behind that of the North if it is to attract FDI. We also find, however, that
medium-term macroeconomic conditions in the North such as fiscal profligacy
and increased rate of time preference deter FDI outflows.
Another finding of the paper is that developing countries that choose to
integrate themselves into the international trading system are good candi-
12In the same speech noted in footnote 2, Lee noted: “To become attractive investment
locations, countries must build up and improve their economic infrastructure, not only in
terms of the “hard” components like roads, transportation and telecommunications, but
also the systems and institutional framework, be it in financial supervision or enforcement
of the rule of law. Equally important, countries must push on with efforts to educate their
populations, and equip them with the skills to take on new jobs with higher technology
content. These are not quick fix, counter-cyclical activities. But sustained over years and
decades, they are the best way to maintain growth and prosperity.”
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dates for the inflow of multi-plant FDI. This is because integrating into the
world trading system achieves the following: For given (total factor) produc-
tivity or quality of social infrastructure, international trade drives down a
country’s wage level to reflect its productivity relative to other more pro-
ductive developing economies that are already recipients of foreign capital.
In this role, trade has served as the “handmaiden of growth,” according to
Kravis (1970). There is, however, another role that international trade plays,
which is potentially as important if we accept the findings of Wei (2000) and
Frankel and Romer (1999). These authors argue that economies that are
“naturally more open” tend to have better institutions. If that is true, inter-
national trade itself leads to improved social infrastructure, which facilitates
the inflow of FDI. From the perspective of this paper, the recent surge of
FDI inflows into China can be explained by the fact that the membership of
China in the WTO signals the country’s commitment to improve its social
infrastructure and willingness to allow its cost and price structures to be
brought in line with external costs and prices.
There are some limitations in the present paper that should now be high-
lighted as we conclude. While the stock of FDI in Singapore has continued
to increase unabated over the past three decades, the character of the foreign
investment has changed over the years. It is clear that our model of symmet-
ric horizontal investment is limited in not accounting for the change in the
character of foreign investment over time—in terms of their factor intensities
and production processes. There is also another dimension to the inflow of
FDI that we have not so far taken into account, which is the role played by
international service links in coordinating the activity of parent firms and
their foreign affiliates. In this conception, Singapore provides headquarter
services, facilitated by the ready physical infrastructure—a good harbor, a
good airport, an excellent land transport system, a wired up economy, etc.—
that enable foreign firms to co-ordinate their activities along the value-added
chain such as transmitting the design specifications to the factory floors of
manufacturing plants located in the labor-abundant neighboring countries.
This aspect of FDI is worthy of future research.
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Figure 1: Real Stock of Foreign Direct Equity Investment in Singapore, 1966-1998 
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Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. Foreign Equity Investment in Singapore. various years.  
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 2000.  
 
Notes: Data adjusted with GDP deflator, 1995=100. 
 
 
Figure 2: Ratio of Singapore Real Manufacturing Wage to Real Manufacturing 
Wage in USA, Japan & UK, 1970-1999 
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Sources: 
• Wage & hours of work: International Labour Office. Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years.  
Japan wage in 1994-1999: Japan Statistics Bureau. Japan Statistical Yearbook, various years.  
• GDP deflator & exchange rates: International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 2000.  
 
Notes: 
• Nominal wages adjusted to real with GDP deflator, 1995=100. 
• Singapore wages were reported “per hour” in 1970-1985 & “per month” in 1986-1999. The series was 
made consistent using the formula: Hours of work per month = (hours of work per week*30)/7. 
• The Singapore-US & Singapore-UK series are based on hourly wages, and the Singapore-Japan 
series on monthly wages.  
• UK wages (excluding Northern Ireland) were reported only as an index before 1985, and both as an 
index and in British pounds thereafter. The indices were calculated into British pounds using 1985 & 
1988 as the anchor years.  
• Since the Yearbook of Labour Statistics had data on Japan wage per month up to only 1993, “wage 
per month” was calculated from the “wage index” reported in Japan Statistical Yearbook using 1993 
as the anchor year.   
• All wages are converted to US$ using the period average market exchange rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Scatter Plot of Inward Stock of FDI in 1995 against Index of Social 
Infrastructure for 120 Countries, 24 Developed and 96 Developing.  
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Sources: 
Social infrastructure index: Hall, Robert E. & Charles Jones (1999), “Why do some countries produce so 
much more output per worker than others?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:83-116.  
FDI: United Nations. World Investment Report 2000.  
 
 
 
Notes:  
1. Social Infrastructure is made up of two indices: an index of government antidiversion policies (GADP) 
for 1986-95 & the extent to which country is open to international trade, measured by the fraction of 
years the economy has been open to trade from 1950-94. 
2. To have a corresponding FDI data set, FDI Inward Stock in 1995 is used.  
3. The data set includes 120 countries listed by Hall & Jones (1999) for which data is available.  
4. The social infrastructure indices for Belgium and Luxembourg are combined into one index by taking 
the average of the two to correspond with the FDI data because the World Investment Report gives 
Belgium and Luxembourg FDI as one.  
5. The selection of 24 countries as developed follows the classification in the World Investment Report.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Real Outflow of Direct Investment from US, Japan & UK, 1970-1999. 
(Based on Balance of Payment Data) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2000. (1995=100) 
 
Notes: “Direct Investment Abroad” defined as “the flow of direct investment capital out of the economy”, 
“includes equity capital, reinvestment earnings and other capital associated with various inter-company 
transactions between affiliated enterprises”. 
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                                        Figure 5: Phase Diagram                                
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             Figure 6: Effect of FDI flows                                      Figure 7: Helicopter Drop of Public Debt 
 
 
 
 
